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INTRODUCTION
In Spain the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy was
characterized by the need to find a solution to the permanent crisis of the old
centralist state, that is, to provide a positive response to the historical claims of
Catalonia and the Basque Country. The double right-left/centre-periphery
consensus which established political autonomy for these minorities is the outcome
of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, and the generalization  of this autonomy was
probably the only compromise possible in these circumstances.
Spain's entry into the European Community in 1986 was seen as the final
step in a political and social process which started after the death of General
Franco, thus putting an end to the country's secular isolation from events taking
place in the rest of Europe.
Nevertheless, as for other nonunitarian Member states, the entry into the
EC has also created problems of a political and institutional nature, which highlight
the shortcomings of the constitutional agreement on the regions. Despite this,
European integration and devolution are not contradictory, but complementary and
increasingly interdependent processes.
Here we will give a brief overview of the devolution process, focussing on
the main and most controversial problems. Second, we will discuss the regional
impact of the European Community. Finally, the findings based on interviews
carried out with two samples of political and socio-economic elites in four relevant
regions will allow us to examine the regional attitudes regarding the EC as well as
the Community initiatives and instruments that could promote institutional and
regional development in a post-1992 context (1).
I. THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS
1. Constitutional provisions
The Spanish Constitution establishes a hybrid system which is neither
federal nor regional, but based on the principles of the “unity of the Spanish nation"
and the "autonomy of the nationalities and regions which constitute it”. Due to the
constitutional pact, the unity-autonomy binomial expresses the difficulties faced by
the parties in reaching a satisfactory agreement as to the organization of the
territorial state. The rather complex and ambiguous nature of the division of power
between the central and regional institutions has been a source of constant political
and judicial controversies leading in many cases to the Constitutional Court.
In principle the Constitution has not established a totally decentralized
state, since the creation of an Autonomous Community (AC) did not depend on the
Spanish Parliament but on a representative territorial assembly which was
responsible for formulating a Statute of Autonomy. The Statutes of Autonomy are
legally protected against future change and hence have a similar standing to the
Constitution in establishing the distribution of powers. Statutes fall into two main
categories which reflect two different ways of reaching autonomy: special and
general. The first one covers the three national minorities (The Basque Country,
Catalonia and Galicia) with the addition of Andalusia. The four Communities have
"full" autonomy Statutes which must be ratified by referendum. The general way,
which corresponds to eleven regions, is just a transitionary one: after a five-year
period the regional authorities can request wider powers to obtain "full" autonomy
(as has already happened in some cases). In addition, the Spanish Parliament can
transfer legislative and executive functions without any statutory reform (this took
place in the Canary Islands and Valencia). Due to the constitutional recognition of
this "traditional rights", Navarra enjoys a full autonomy regime too. Thus the
Spanish system, despite the initial heterogeneity, in fact tends towards
homogeneity.
Obviously, devolution includes institutional and administrative organization. The
Constitution establishes three kinds of institutions: a legislative assembly elected by
universal suffrage, a government council headed by a president, and a high court of
justice. According to the principle of selfgovernment, each AC determines its own
administrative organization.
The distribution of functions is based on two lists. According to section
148.2 each AC can take on the following functions: organization of regional
administration; local administration (some minor functions); territorial planning
(urban planning, housing, public works, environment, etc.); social services, culture
and economic policy (tourism, small trades and industry, agriculture and fishing,
communications and regional development).
However, the real limitation to devolution relates to the central state
functions (section 149.1). The legal provision is rather ambiguous and has given
rise to numerous conflicts requiring the intervention of Constitutional Court, either at
the request of central or regional governments (especially Catalonia, Basque
Country and Galicia). As a general rule, the Constitution attributes to the central
institutions the "basic legislation" or "basic norms" relating to functions that can be
taken on too by the AC's in their Statutes (agriculture, banking and credit, health,
education, economic planning, territorial setting, employment, transport,
environment, public mass media, local government, etc.). In addition, in some areas
central and regional authorities are both fully competent (culture or research policy).
This leads to a system of shared legislative functions in which the limits between the
two powers are rather unclear. Thus, public actors often operate unilaterally
invading each other's competences.
The Spanish system only partly follows the principles of executive
federalism. The regions enforce their own regulations as well as the central "basic"
or general legislation. Nevertheless, central institutions maintain some executive
functions dealing with “supraregional" services or “general interests" (Muñoz
Machado, 1982) which thus provides them with territorial bodies. Central controls
over regional administrations are only allowed when they carry out functions
previously transferred or delegated by central institutions.
Following traditional federalism, the Constitution establishes several
mechanisms to ensure the representation of regional interests at the national level.
Some members of the Upper Chamber (Senado) are directly elected by territorial
parliaments and these can also deposit bills in the Lower Chamber (Congreso).
Finally, regions enjoy financial autonomy according to the principles of
coordination with state. finance and interregional solidarity. The regional financing
system is broadly based on shared central revenues, regional tax revenues and
contributions from a shared cooperation fund (Fondo de Compensación
Interterritorial). Nevertheless, the main revenues -especially the income taxes-
belong to the central state.
2. Current practice
2.1. Conflicts
Since 1982, the majority government has freed the socialist party (PSOE) from the
obligation of having to negotiate the laws defining the functions and powers of
central institutions affecting those of the regions (e.g. public administration, electoral
system personnel, education and university, health and police). These laws
considerably reduced their range of powers forcing the Constitutional Court to
intervene. At the same time the central government has not hesitated in opposing
regional legal and administrative arrangements when they were considered to
encroach on central competences. By 1989, these controversies had generated
more than 800 legal disputes (Aja, 1990) and reflect an extremely high degree of
conflict. However, the decisions of the Constitutional Court, in which regions are not
represented, have tended to preserve the intervening powers of the  central
institutions. Moreover, the 1985 Local Government Act -which established the
province as the second level of local administration- allows central government to
transfer grants and other resources to provincial and local councils thus
implementing central policies by by-passing the regional level.
2.2. Lack of cooperation
Despite appearances, the Spanish Constitution does not provide for the
effective integration of regional concerns in the general decision making process.
The Senate is in fact a non-specialized chamber, elected on majority basis at the
provincial level, where national parties dominate. Only 20% of senators are elected
directly from regional parliaments. This situation weakens institutional cohesion,
leads to centrifugal tendencies and, in short, undermines the system's ability to
function.
In addition, the role of the sectorial conferencies (more than 30)
instituzionalized since 1983 is in no way comparable to that of similar bodies in
West Germany. They barely facilitate the exchange of information already adopted
unilaterally or negotiated without the existing procedures (e.g. the financial
arrangements). The political negotiation with central authorities is normally carried
out by bilateral arrangements. This hinders the adoption of global agreements. In
addition, there is no horizontal coordination among regional administrations, not
even with the aim to exchange experiences or points of view.
Effective coordination is the result of the political bargaining which has
dominated the devolution process, allowing short-term political calculations to
prevail over the need for rationality and efficiency. The highly complex nature of its
administrative workings reveals some characteristics common to decentralization:
fragmentation, disparity of functions, central interferences, absence of a clear model
of public administration and -hence- the constant presence of political and
institutional conflict.
The existing model of intergovernmental relations reflects two
policy-making styles. The first one -of partisan inspiration characterizes the relations
between central government and the ten regions under socialist control.
Policy-making is fundamentally based on internal party negotiation. The conflict
burst out in response to power struggles and not because of institutional
disagreements. The second style corresponds to the relations between Madrid and
the AC governed by nationalist forces -particularly Catalonia and the Basque
country- or rightwing parties. Here, the behavior of the actors -based on political
antagonism- has until now been basically reactive, oscillating between the
constitutional management of conflicts and hard bargaining until a bilateral
agreement is reached. In the end, one side attitudes (partisan, exploitation of
institutional confrontation, mutual distrust and political victimization) have tended to
dominate the common values and interests that could promote consensus and
cooperation.
2.3. The distribution of financial resources
The legal development of the Constitution established -with the exception of the
Basque Country and Navarre (2)- a provisional financing system for the AC, which
came into force until 1986, based on the evaluation of the central services devolved
to the new administrations, the product of transferred taxes and the Interterritorial
Cooperation Fund. The first mechanism required the formulation of a very complex
method of evaluation and the establishment of seventeen bilateral commissions to
estimate the annual cost of transferred services. In fact, the combination of both
elements has allowed central authorities to decide the amount of matching
revenues according to central budget priorities. At the same-time, the AC did not
create their own taxes, avoiding playing the unpopular role of tax collectors.
Moreover, the Cooperation Fund (around 30% of central budget investment) has
failed in the double function of reducing territorial disparities and providing financial
investments for all regions.   In these circumstances the new authorities had no
other option than to run into increasing indebtness (15% of total expenditure in
1990).
The new finance system -effective only from 1987 to 1991- is the result of
a difficult commitment which has already been called into question. The most
important innovations concern the division of the cooperation fund into two
independent blocks (less developed and more developed regions) and the
prospects for permanent participation in some central revenues. Despite political
disagreements and as a consequence of the progressive transfer of functions, in
1990 the participation ok regional authorities in total public expenditure rose to 22%,
which represented 32.6% of public investment.
II. THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
1. The institutional impact
As has already been noted, Spain's entry into the EC has had institutional
and political consequences at the regional level. As in the other decentralized
Member States (Schwan, 1982; Merloni, 1985; Verweyen, 1985; Morata, 1987) the
transfer of sovereignty has had negative effects on the constitutional position of the
regions which, in contrast to the central government, do not participate directly in
Community decision-making. The loss of decision-making powers affects many
areas, particularly after the enforcement of the SEA: finance, agriculture, industry,
economic planning, territorial policy, transport, research, environment and
consumer rights.
Nevertheless, according to the internal distribution of functions, the
regions ought to implement Community policies related to their own competences
and to those shared with central institutions. The effect of a regulatory Directive on
one of these shared areas would normally be the displacement of the central state
by European institutions, thus allowing the AC to proceed to the direct
implementation of the Community rule (Garcia de Enterria, 1990). Despite the
exceptional coercive power of central institutions to ensure regional duties (3), the
constitutional requirements are unable to guarantee the execution of European
Directives according to the allowed delays. Until now, there has been only one
conflict on this subject when in 1989 the Canarian government initially refused to
implement the customs tariffs reduction forseen in the adhesion treaty. Political
negotiation facilitated the resolution of the controversy. Conflicts arise more
frequently when both levels of government consider themselves competent (4).
2. Participation in the decision-making process
The integration of subcentral institutions in the Community decision
process is still an unsolved problem in the current debate on the European
integration. Due to the indifference of Community treaties regarding the
constitutional structures of the Member states, only internal approaches have been
available. Anyhow, comparative analysis shows that preserving internal balance of
powers depends more on political negotiations and intergovernmental cooperation
than on constitutional interpretations (Hrbek-Thaysen, 1987; Morata, 1987). In
contrast to West Germany, in Spain participation of the regions via the Senate is
obviously not feasible. In 1986, faced with pressure from the regional authorities,
the central government presented a project for an "Agreement on cooperation in
matters of Community affairs".
2.1. The central government proposal
The proposal, negotiated until 1988, has come in a standstill. This was based on the
informal "Länder" procedure in force in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1980
to 1986 (Schumann-Hanneleck, 1983). It provided for the transfer of all information
affecting regional domains. The subcentral authorities would inform government of
their policy criteria with a view to forming the "state will", and forcing the executive
to incorporate them, "if possible", into the Spanish position, providing hey where
compatible with the "general interests” of the state and the process of integration. In
order to make the procedure operational, a proposal was made to constitute a
regional committee through which AC would coordinate themselves and cooperate
with the central authorities in order to provide information and express regional
opinions. In addition, the committee could propose the designation of an "observer"
and an  "extra observer" for the regions as members of the permanent Spanish
representation in Brussels, with diplomatic status under the jurisdiction of the
Spanish ambassador. The functions of the observers would include sending reports
and documents to the regional committee. As members of the permanent
representation, both observers could attend meetings of EC committees and
working groups, "expressing opinions coinciding with those of official delegation".
The technical shortcomings of the proposal were rather obvious: What
kind of information should be sent and how could it be evaluated? How to organise
coordination and decision-making among seventeen actors with unequal
competences? To what extent would the regional opinions be taken into account?
However, the main problem is that the most powerful regions want their own
representative to have a greater degree of autonomy with respect to the official
representation. The central government's refusal to accept this request has blocked
any possibility of political agreement on this subject.
2.1. The limited agreement
Due to the lack of consensus, the only effective arrangements reached
until now refer to some basic principles and practical aspects. The first item includes
the mutual compromise to respect the internal distribution of functions and the
loyalty to the Constitution in matters dealing to the EC. Second, in May 1990 both
authorities decided to establish a telematic data base, linked to the State Secretary
for European Communities, which provides Community information to regional
governments. Besides, a coordination agreement has been reached to face the
Community law breaches.
The intergovernmental conference for Community Affairs remain the only
tool available for regional participation. Nonetheless, we have already mentioned
the general deficiencies which characterize this kind of cooperation, so the room for
a real intervention in the decision-making process remains very little.
3. Organizational measures
The implementation of Community regulations has meant a reorganization
of administrative organigrams and bureaucratic bodies in response to the new
requirements.
The vast majority of the organizational rules are directed towards the
establishment of mechanisms of coordination which aim to achieve a more precise
distribution of responsabilities to each of the ministerial departments involved in
matters linked to the EC. They seek too greater efficiency in obtaining resources
from the Community's structural funds and gaining access to other forms of finance.
The mechanisms established generally I take the form of an interdepartmental
commission or committee which, grouping together the General Directors of various
departments, carries out responsabilities for coordination and planning activities
related to the EC. In general, the department of Presidency centralizes the
institutional relations with the European authorities.
4. Links with Community and interest groups
The integration of interest groups through information and consulting
procedures is seen as a political priority by most of regional administrations. In
Catalonia, the "Patronat Català pro-Europa", a public consortium established in
1982, takes care of organizing, promoting and coordinating activities linked to the
Community and other European organizations. Chaired by the President of
Catalonia, the "Patronat" assembles representatives of Catalan public and private
Universities, Save banks, Chamber of Trade and Industry, Local Government
associations and the Townhall of Barcelona. The body's council is organized in
three sections: the academic, the parliamentarian and the socio-economic, in which
participate enterpreneurial organizations, professional associations and unions,
including Catalan representatives of Community lobbies and officials in Brussels.
The main activities of the "Patronat" are the preparation of courses and
seminars about the EC especially addressed to economic and professional sectors;
the diffusion of the R&D Community programmes; and a consulting service called
"Europa-93" aimed to provide information about the impact of the internal market. In
1986 the institution opened an office in Brussels which supplies information and
contacts with the Commission and other Community institutions. Nearly 50% of
these are requested by economic, social and professional sectors.
The governments of Basque Country, Canary Islands, Galicia, Murcia and
Valencia have set up offices too in Brussels with the legal status of limited trade
companies. Initially, the Basque office was established in a Basque Government
Decree proposing a Cabinet for European Community Affairs, which amongst other
functions would "coordinate relations between Basque Public Institutions on the one
hand and Community Bodies and the Council of Europe on the other, and manage
and coordinate relations with the European Institutions in general from an Office in
Brussels". This decision caused a "conflict of competences" lodged by the central
government against the Basque provisions. As a consequence, the Basque
authorities decided to create a Public Company ("Interbask") with the aim of
“ensuring direct and immediate observation of the activities of the EC, insofar as
they affect matters and economic sectors of great importance to the Basque
country". Through its proximity to Community institutions, the body carries out
consultancy work for public and private organizations, spreads awareness of
European issues and takes responsibility for the organization, promotion and
coordination of Basque activities relating to the Community. Its administration is
ascribed to the Department of the Presidency, Justice and Autonomous
Development.
III. REGIONAL ATTITUDES REGARDING THE EC
The results of a sampling carried out in 1989 in Andalusia, Catalonia,
Galicia and Valencia among regional elites allow us to evaluate the attitudes
regarding the EC. The interviews included 200 parliamentarians -half of the total-
distributed according to political and geographical representation, and 100 regional
observers (Chambers of Trade and Industry, unions, general and sectorial
entrepreneurial organizations, professional corporations, cultural and environmental
associations, local government organizations at regional level, and others). We will
first characterize the most relevant socio-economic and political aspects of the four
regions.
1. Socio-economic framework
Andalusia is the most populated and extensive region (6.8 million
inhabitants; 87,268 sq km.). Its standard rate of economic productivity is equivalent
to 78% of the Spanish average, with a high percentage of the population employed
in agriculture (19%) and a high level of unemployment (ca. 30% in 1987).
Catalonia (6 million inhabitants; 32,000 sq km.), whose average income is
one of the first in Spain, is mainly an industrial region which generates nearly one
quarter of the Spanish industrial product, with a clear predominance of small and
medium-sized industry. The industrial crisis has meant a drastic loss of employment
in the sector, offset since 1988 by the extension of modern services sector. As in
the other regions, there is a clear need for investment for environmental protection.
Galicia (2.85 million inhabitants; 29,500 sq km.) is a rural region where the
primary sector employes 45.6% of active population generating only 11.4 of GRP.
The region suffers from serious problems of internal and external communications.
Valencia (3.73 million inhabitants; 23,305 sq km.) generates an average
income similar to the Spanish one. The major sectors are agricultural exports (40%
from the Spanish ones) and manufacturing, based on small and medium-sized
traditional industry.
2. Institutional and political framework
The four AC have a similar institutional structure (parliamentary
government, presidential executive and proportional electoral system). The statutes
forsee the exercise of functions in most policy areas related to economic policy and
industrial development.
Each territory constitutes too a specific political subsystem, which
expresses the ideological and cultural pluralism of Spain. Eight parties are
represented in the parliament of Catalonia, four of whom exclusively catalan. The
region is governed since 1980 by a centre-right nationalist coalition (CiU). In
Andalusia and Valencia the PSOE governs with a wide majority since 198,2 and
1983, respectively, with the opposition of four other parties. In both regions there is
a single regional party. Six parties sit in the parliament of Galicia, of which only two
exist at the national level. Since 1981 six party coalitions have come into power until
the actual rightwing government (PP).
3. The results
The results of both samples are set out under three main headings: the
regional economic structures, the role of the EC and the common regional
initiatives.
3.1. The adaptation Of socio-economic structures
Among the observers there is no doubt as to the low level of adaptation of
socioeconomic structures for the appointment with 1992 (Table 1). In all regions the
opinions are rather negative as to the railway and road transport networks, health
and social services, the functionality of urban areas and the levels of technological
innovation and labour force skills. We should note the unanimously negative
responses to the first two items in Galicia. Political elites and observers
agree-although the former are less pessimistic-especially as regards the level of
technological innovation (Catalonia), level of labour force skill (Catalonia and
Valencia), the structure of small and medium-sized industries (Valencia), the
utilization of historico-environmental resources (Andalusia), and the port system
(Andalusia).
Among the regions Andalusia registers the highest level of negative
judgements on the adaptation of socio-economic structures, with the only -partial-
exception being air transport. In Galicia respondents gave quite positive opinions for
the port system, university and air transport, which can be accounted for by the
importance of fishing industry, the recent creation of three universities and the need
to compensate for the shortcomings of the territorial transport system. In Valencia
the. restructuring of industry and the port system are considered to be satisfactory
and this is linked to the recent modernization of the steel industry.
Last, as expected, Catalonia presents the highest level of economic
adaptation, at least in some key sectors: industrial economic adaptation, together
with the tertiary sector, structure of SMEs (the most dynamic ones) and use of
historico-environmental resources. Only Catalonia registers positive responses on
levels of associationalism. According to recent empirical analysis (Putnam, 1988),
this may explain the higher levels of performance found in that region.
3.2. The impact of 1992
Both regional observers and political elites have a clear idea as to the
impact of 1992 on their associations (Table 2). In their view the impact will be very
positive in all matters affecting economic development. The increasing level of
unemployment is not considered likely, even though observers in Catalonia,
Andalusia and Galicia believe that production costs will increase. According to
parliamentarians 1992 will lead to the modernization of regional administration.
Significantly, all observers disagree on this point. There is a general agreement as
to the likelihood of institutional renewal, the adoption of new environmental
standards, and the improvement of social services. No loss of regional identity is
anticipated. Nevertheless, both sets of respondents feared the confusion of
functions between the different levels of administration, or even some kind of slow
down in the decision-making process, specially in Catalonia and Galicia. Andalusian
and Galician observers are more worried about deterioration in underdeveloped
areas.
3.3. The new Community functions
There is almost unanimous agreement as to the extension of EC functions
(Table 3). In other words, the Community ought to increase its economic powers in
all areas, particularly in financing projects for less developed areas, the promotion
of technological innovation and the evaluation of regional investment projects.
Observers and politicians agree that financing a European defence policy should
remain the same, and that there should be a high level of immigration control for
non-EC countries.
3.4. The new EC policy instruments
Community policy instruments are welcome in all cases (Table 4).
Particularly, regions believe that a Euro-environmental agency, a European
communications body and the availability of their own offices in Brussels are
indispensable. A central Eurobank, programmes, agencies or consortia for regional
cooperation, together with a Community administrative court and the European
conference of regional presidents are highly desirable. It is rather difficult to
differentiate among politicians and observers or between regions. In any case,
observers in Galicia and observers and political elites in Valencia express in general
the lowest preferences for a European environmental agency, euro-administrative
court and agencies for interregional cooperation, conference of regional presidents,
post-graduate diplomas and control of firms and banks.
3.5. Common transregional initiatives
Regions are ready to support initiatives which could promote horizontal
relations (Table 5). There is general agreement as to the need to protect the
environment, to formulate and implement development projects, plans for applied
research, integrated programmes for border regions and policies to improve
interregional communications. At the same time, they express a clear wish to build
cultural-tourist exchange programmes or activities, promote products and services
or joint ventures, strengthening regional air services and training civil service
personnel. The idea of a regional lobby in Brussels is generally welcomed.
CONCLUSIONS
Regional devolution and Spain entry into the EC are two relevant aspects
of Spanish institutional and political life in the 1980s. The problem is, however, how
to make the two compatible. The transfer of internal competences to the Community
has taken place in a context of marked differences in the distribution of political
power, which in turn give rise to permanent conflicts in centre-periphery relations.
These political and administrative shortcomings vis-a-vis social demands and
Community challenges necessitate a deep review of political attitudes, with the aim
of increasing coordination and cooperation.
Our sample shows a regional political system which is quite
well-established, and where cultural identity cleavages are added to ideological
ones, particularly in the case of the national minorities. Despite differences in
perception, both observers and political elites stress the inadequacy of regional
socio-economic structures. Preferences about the new role of the EC cover all
suggested areas, particularly economic development and promotion of
technological innovation. The same positive attitude is evident in the use of sectorial
or regional EC instruments. Lastly, the promotion of transregional cooperation
receives a high degree of support. In short, Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia and
Valencia see the increasing powers of the EC as a need linked to the 1993 Single
Market. Instead of a risk, they regard it as a chance to develop their own potential
and to establish European transregional networks.
Table1
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NOTES
(1) This paper summarizes the Spanish contribution to a research project directed by Robert Leonardi
(European University Institute of Florence) on "Regions and European Integration". The project,
carried out from 1989 until 1990, involved the survey of elite opinion based on extensive fieldwork
and data gathering in four countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the two cases of
Corsica and Northern Ireland for a total of twenty-two regional sites.
(2) The Basque Country and Navarra retained their traditional financial agreement (“concierto
económico") with the central state which allows them to collect their own taxes and pass on an
agreed sum to the centre.
(3) According to section 155 of the Spanish Constitution the central authorities, with the previous
agreement of the absolute majority of the Senate, are allowed to constrain the autonomous
governments to fulfil their constitutional duties.
(4) In case 252/88 the Constitutional Court has considered that the application of Community Law 'did
not alter the internal structure of distribution of competences between the central state and the
autonomous governments.
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